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INTRODUCTION

The encryption debate over whether there should be a lawful access
requirement has re-emerged in recent years with major security
implications. This debate has become part of the larger discussion about
balancing changing technological capabilities, national security threats,
and the evolution of society's sense of privacy. Although this is an
important area of legal policy, unfortunately, thus far the opposing sides
of this issue have been unwilling to engage in meaningful deliberations
with those on the other side. This Article thoroughly analyzes the
legitimate arguments that exist on both sides with the aim of finding a
reasonable solution to the encryption debate.
Law enforcement and intelligence officials fear that they may not be
able to prevent terrorist attacks or conduct criminal investigations and
prosecute criminal activity without access to communications. Thus, law
enforcement and intelligence agencies have advocated for a lawful access
requirement to mandate that companies maintain access to users'
communications and data, and provide law enforcement or intelligence
agencies with that access upon receipt of a lawful order. However, there
are serious concerns that a mandated lawful access requirement would
increase users' vulnerability to various cyber-threats, and would decrease
the market share and economic viability of U.S. companies. Also, this
debate over whether there should be a lawful access requirement has
privacy and civil liberties implications in the United States and around
the world. Ultimately, the United States should mandate a lawful access
requirement, and it is technologically feasible to securely achieve this.
This will enable law enforcement and intelligence agencies to continue
pursuing their security missions in an effective manner, while
maintaining cybersecurity and U.S. companies' market share and
economic viability.
Part I provides a brief explanation of encryption, and the two types of
encryption that are at the center of this debate, which are end-to-end
encryption and endpoint encryption-also called device encryption.
Part II discusses the history of the encryption debate. The current debate
is actually not the first time that encryption has been a focal point of
heated legal, policy, security, and privacy discussions. The government's
access to encrypted communications has been debated since the 1970s,
and first came to a head in the 1990s. This has been called the "Crypto
Wars." Part III examines the two developments that have spurred the
second coming of the "Crypto Wars." First, encryption is increasingly
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becoming the default setting on devices. Second, service providers are
offering end-to-end encryption on products and encrypting data that is
stored in cloud storage systems.
Both sides of this debate present compelling arguments, and Part IV
thoroughly analyzes law enforcement and intelligence concerns about
encryption as well as private sector and security concerns about
mandating a lawful access requirement. Law enforcement and
intelligence agencies are concerned that they are "going dark" because
there is an increasing number of electronic communications that they
have the legal authority to intercept, but cannot feasibly do so. The private
sector and security officials have expressed numerous reasons why they
oppose a lawful access requirement. The most prominent among these
arguments is the fear that the technological architecture that would
guarantee law enforcement and intelligence agencies access would
compromise user security and privacy. This Article argues that the
greatest potential harm from requiring lawful access is actually not the
potential for user security and privacy to be compromised; rather, the
greatest potential harm is the possible decrease in the market share and
economic viability of U.S. companies. This aspect of the debate has not
been analyzed enough, and this Article finds that the common assumption
that U.S. companies will lose market share and economic viability
because of a lawful access requirement is incorrect. After a thorough
examination of both sides of the debate and the alternatives that have been
put forth to a lawful access requirement, this Article concludes that
Congress should mandate a lawful access requirement by requiring
companies to have the capacity to deliver decrypted information upon
applicable legal process.
Subsequently, Part V takes on the challenge of examining how a
lawful access requirement could be achieved by analyzing several current
proposals. Technological innovations could be developed, users could be
given greater control, or industry incentives could be altered through
conditional liability protections. Ultimately, Part VI supports the
development of technological innovations to achieve the lawful access
requirement that this Article calls on Congress to enact.
I. WHAT Is ENCRYPTION?

Encryption is the process of encoding data or information such that
only those who are authorized by the creator of the information are able
to access the data or information.' Those who are not authorized by the
1. CHERTOFF GROUP, THE GROUND TRUTH ABOUT ENCRYPrION 3 (2016). See also
Katerina P. Lewinbuk, There is No App for That: The Needfor Legal Educators and Practioners
to Comply with Ethical Standardsin the Modern Era, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 321 (2013).
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creator of the data or information to have access are prevented access to
encrypted data or information. 2 Even if a third party without authorization
intercepts the data or information, encrypted data or information will
appear unreadable.
The types of encryption at the heart of this debate are end-to-end
encryption and endpoint encryption-also called device encryption. Endto-end encryption is the encryption of messages in transit such that only
the original sender and intended recipient hold the keys to decrypt the
communication. 3 The message in transit can therefore only be read by the
original sender and intended recipient.4 This type of encryption is
important for protecting data in motion. Endpoint encryption is when the
keys only exist on locked devices, which prevents the contents of the
device from being read by anyone who does not possess the keys.s This
type of encryption is important for protecting stored information-data
at rest.
H.

THE "CRYPTO WARS"

The current encryption debate is not the first time this subject has been
analyzed. In fact, government access to encrypted communications has
been debated since the 1970s. 6 This ongoing debate has been called the
"Crypto Wars." 7 The National Security Agency (NSA) and other
intelligence agencies advocated for the export control and restriction of
strong encryption.8 They sought to limit the ability of technology
companies to export products with strong encryption and to inhibit
researchers from publishing cryptographic research.9 Similar to today,
intelligence agencies worried that encryption could be used by
adversaries in a manner that would make it more difficult to conduct
signals intelligence (SIGINT), which would threaten U.S. national
security. o
2.

CHERTOFF GROUP, supra note 1, at 3.

3.

MATTHEW G. OLSEN ET AL., DON'T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE "GOING DARK"

DEBATE 4 (2016).

4. Id.
5. Id
6.

See, e.g., DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., DOOMED TO REPEAT HISTORY? LESSONS FROM THE

CRYPTO WARS OF THE 1990s 2 (2015) (recounting the history of the encryption debate).
7. Id.
8.

See generally id

9.

See 22 C.F.R.

§ 121, Category XII(b) (1995) (listing the cryptographic items on the

munitions list); id. § 125.1 (requiring a license for the export of items listed on the munitions list).
10. See, e.g., John Markoff, Paper on Codes Is Sent Despite U.S. Objections, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/09/us/paper-on-codes-is-sent-despite-us-

objections.html ("Over the past 12 years the National Security Agency has consistently opposed
the publication or transmission of research on encryption technology. The agency is concerned
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The "Crypto Wars" came to a head in the 1990s as encryption
technologies became more widespread. Relatively low-cost computers
gained enough processing power in the 1990s "to be capable of
encrypting data with a level of security that would make it nearly
impossible for the government to break."" Law enforcement agencies
believed the spread of this technology would adversely affect their
investigations and joined the effort to limit encryption.12 Furthermore, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was concerned with telephone
companies' move from copper wires to fiber optics in the 1990s.' 3 The
move to fiber optics made traditional telephone wiretaps less useful. 14 In
1992, the FBI warned that by 1995 at most only 60% of wiretaps would
be useful, and at worst wiretaps would be completely useless.1 5
On the other hand, the technology industry, technologists, and civil
libertarians opposed the government's hindrance of cryptology.1 6 The
technology industry and technologists believed widespread encryption
was beneficial because the security of critical infrastructure and financial
markets were increasingly becoming
dependent
on strong
cybersecurity.17 Civil libertarians believed the government's export
control restrictions violated crypto raphers' First Amendment rights and
that encryption enhanced privacy.
The government sought to combat encryption through continued
export control and key escrow, in which the government or a neutral third
party would hold the keys in escrow. In 1993, the NSA developed the
Clipper Chip as a key escrow system. 19 The Clipper Chip was designed

that advances in cryptography will make it harder to break coded transmissions sent by foreign
intelligence agents in the United States to their governments.").
11.

DANIEL CASTRo & ALAN MCQUINN, UNLOCKING ENCRYPrION: INFORMATION SECURITY

AND THE RULE OF LAW 7 (2016).

12. See Statement by The Press Secretary, WHITE HOUSE 1 (Apr. 16, 1993),
https://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/whitehouse statement_4_93.html
(acknowledging
law
enforcement's concerns about losing the ability to lawfully intercept communications when

announcing the Clipper Chip proposal).
13. See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, 'Going Dark' Versus a 'Golden Age for
Surveillance,' CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 28, 2011), https://cdt.org/blog/%E2/`80%98

going-darkE2 0/80%99-versus-a-%E2 0/o80%98golden-age-for-surveillance%E2 0/o80%99/
(discussing the origins of law enforcement's and intelligence agencies' worries about losing
surveillance capabilities before arguing that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have a
greater access to data today than ever before).

14.

Id.

15.

FEDERAL
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OVERVIEW 21 (1992).

16.

CASTRO & MCQUINN, supra note I1, at 7-8.

17.
18.

Id. at 7-8.
Id.

19.

Steven

Levy,

Battle of the

ADVANCED

Clipper Chip, N.Y.

TIMES

TELEPHONY

(June

12,

UNIT,

1994),

http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html?pagewanted=all.
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for phones to provide encryption while also producing an encryption key
that would be available to the NSA. 2 0 Although implementation of the
Clipper Chip was voluntary, it was the federal standard, which made the
government optimistic that it would become widespread because
industries that dealt with the federal government would need to adopt the
system. 2 1The Clipper Chip was met with a great deal of backlash, though.
People feared that the chip would compromise their privacy. 2 2 Also,
shortly after the first Clipper Chip products entered the market, a
cryptographer, Matt Blaze, discovered and publicly disclosed
vulnerabilities in the Clipper Chip.2 3 This led the government to cease its
promotion of the Clipper Chip. 2 4
Although the government's key escrow effort failed, law enforcement
was able to secure the passage of the Communications Assistance to Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994. CALEA addressed the concern that
the shift from copper wires to fiber optics made traditional wiretaps less
useful by requiring telecommunications carriers to ensure their networks
could be wiretapped pursuant to a court order.25 CALEA was
intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to
conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently, despite
the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services
by the telecommunications industry.
CALEA requires
telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities,
and services to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized
electronic surveillance.2 6
Thus, the government was at least able to ensure that law enforcement
could continue to conduct electronic surveillance regardless of the type
of telecommunications system used.2 7 However, CALEA did not address
encryption. The statute did not authorize law enforcement "to require any
20. Id.
21. See id. (noting that while the Clipper Chip was voluntary, the government hoped the
marketplace would adopt the system).
22.

Peter H. Lewis, Of Privacy and Security: The Clipper Chip Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.

14, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/24/business/of-privacy-and-security-the-clipperchip-debate.html?pagewanted=all.
23. Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahman, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 416, 435 (2012).
24. Mike McConnel, Michael Chertoff, & William Lynn, Why the Fear over Ubiquitous
Data Encryption is Overblown, WASH. POST (July 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/

opinions/the-need-for-ubiquitous-data-encryption/2015/07/28/3dl45952-324e- lle5-8353-12154
75949f4 story.html.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012).
26.

PATRICIA

MOLONEY

FIGIOLA, DIGITAL

ASSISTANCE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT ACT 1 (2007).

27.

Id at 3.

SURVEILLANCE:

THE COMMUNICATIONS
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specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system
configurations to be adopted" or "to prohibit the adoption of any
equipment, facility, service, or feature." 2 In addition, CALEA included
the caveat that "[a] telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible
for decrypting, or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt, any
communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the
encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the
information necessary to decrypt the communication." 29 Further,
CALEA's focus was on telecommunications carriers, not Internet-based
communications services, which were still in an early stage of
development at the time of CALEA's passage.3 0 Although CALEA has
been interpreted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
expand the statute's reach to "facilities-based broadband Internet access
and Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP) services that are fully
interconnected with the public switched telephone network," CALEA
does not cover "popular Internet-based communications services such as
email, Internet messaging, social networking sites, or peer-to-peer
services." 3 1
Another way the government tried to limit the spread of encryption
was that encryption software and related technologies continued to
remain on the U.S. Munitions List through the early 1990s, which meant
that encryption was treated as a defense-related technology and its export
was heavily regulated by the Department of State. 3 2 In 1996, President
Bill Clinton removed commercial encryption products from the U.S.
Munitions List but continued to mandate that only "export-grade"
encryption could be shipped overseas rather than the stronger encryption
that was being developed. 33 In 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the government's export controls, which restricted the
publication of source code, violated cryptographers' First Amendment
rights to free speech in Bernstein.3 4 This, along with continued backlash
28.
29.

47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) (2012).
Id. § 1002(b)(3).

30. Going Dark Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 8-9 (2015) (joint statement

of Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, and James B. Comey, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).

31. Id.
32. See 22 C.F.R. § 121, Category XIII(b) (1995) (listing the cryptographic items on the
munitions list); id. § 125.1 (requiring a license for the export of items listed on the munitions list).
33. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58767 (Nov. 19, 1996).
34. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g
granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). The court also expressed that
"[glovemment efforts to control encryption thus may well implicate not only the First Amendment

rights of cryptographers intent on pushing the boundaries of their science, but also the
constitutional rights of each of us as potential recipients of encryption's bounty." Id. at 1146. The
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from industry and advocacy groups, as well as international trade
considerations resulted in the government relaxing export controls.
Despite losing the "Crypto Wars" regarding encryption, the
government's fears of the downsides of encryption did not come to
fruition. Instead, encryption went largely unused by the general public.
Encryption's complexity made it too difficult to be used in a widespread
manner. 3 6 Also, the FBI received greater resources to enhance its
technical capabilities, and the government worked with industry to
develop a partnership to enable lawful intercepts to be conducted.3 7
I.

THE DEBATE RE-EMERGES

Two recent developments have spurred the re-emergence of this
debate. First, encryption is increasingly becoming the default setting on
devices. 3 8 Data was formerly stored on devices in an unencrypted form
unless the user took affirmative action to use encryption. 3 9 Now,
however, more devices will encrypt data by default unless the user takes
affirmative action to turn this function off and store data in an
unencrypted form.4 0 Thus, the burden of action formerly favored not
using encryption, whereas now the burden of action will favor using
encryption. This will greatly increase the prevalence of endpoint
encryption. Apple, in particular, has been a leader in promoting default
endpoint encryption. In 2014, Apple announced it would include default
encryption of its devices that use the iOS 8 mobile operating system.41
Google followed suit by making encryption the default on its Android
operating system. 42
Second, service providers are offering end-to-end encryption on
products and encrypting data that is stored in cloud storage systems. 4 3
These products encrypt data, information, and communications in such a
case did not continue because the government revised its policy.
35. CASTRO & MCQUINN, supra note 11, at 8. See Geoff Winestock, EU to Ease Export
Rules for Encryption Software, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2000), http://www.wsj.com/articles/

SB956867771608897487 (discussing the European Union's agreement to liberalize export
regulations on encryption products).
36. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-5.
37. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 13.
38. CHERTOFF GRoup, supra note 1, at 1.

39.
40.

Id.
Id.

41.

See David E. Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone

Locks Out N.S.A., N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/
iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.htm (detailing Apple's new use of
default encryption).

42.

See id. (noting Google's switch to default encryption).

43.

CHERTOFF GROUP, supra note 1, at 1.
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way that the service provider does not have the technical capability to
decrypt the information." Therefore, these providers cannot respond to
lawful process because they do not possess the information the
government is requesting. 4 5 In 2014, WhatsApp, an instant messaging
service on smartphones that is now owned by Facebook, announced it
would use end-to-end encryption. 4 6 Other applications that have also
implemented end-to-end encryption have become popular recently, too.
IV. THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Concerns
The FBI has led the government's involvement in the current debate
since 2010.47 The FBI is concerned that it is "going dark" because there
is an increasing number of electronic communications that the FBI has
the legal authority to intercept, but cannot feasibly do so. 4 8 Reports have
indicated that encryption and other technological means, like proxy
servers, can conceal information from lawful electronic surveillance.
Intelligence agencies, especially the NSA and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), also face difficulties in fulfilling their missions of
gathering intelligence because of encryption.5 0 The NSA and CIA have
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Andy Greenberg, WhatsApp Just Switched on End-to-End Encryptionfor Hundreds of
Millions of Users, WIRED (Nov. 18,2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11I/whatsapp-encryptedmessaging/.
47. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easierto Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES

(Sept. 27, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html (discussing the FBI's
initial efforts to address the growing concerns that investigators will lose the ability to intercept
communications they are lawfully authorized to intercept).
48. See generally Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, andHomeland Security ofthe
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Hearing on Going Dark: Lawful
Electronic Surveillance in the Face ofNew Technologies] (examining the "growing gap between
the legal authority and the technical capability to intercept electronic communications").
49.

See generally FEDERAL

BUREAU

REPORT, GOING DARK: LAW ENFORCEMENT

OF INVESTIGATION

SITUATIONAL

INFORMATION

PROBLEMS IN LAWFUL SURVEILLANCE

(2011)

(explaining the problems that new technologies are posing for lawfully-authorized electronic

surveillance).
50. See Anna Mulrine, New Encryption Technology is Aiding Terrorists, Intelligence
Director Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Politics/monitorbreakfast/2016/0425/New-encryption-technology-is-aiding-terrorists-intelligen
ce-director-says (reporting on James Clapper's, the Director of National Intelligence, comments

regarding encryption inhibiting the Intelligence Community's ability to collect intelligence,
especially against terrorists); CIA DirectorJohn Brennan on 60 Minutes, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 14,
2016),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-director-john-brennan-60-minutes-scott-pelley/
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greater resources to combat this problem than the FBI, though.
Furthermore, the "going dark" problem is most acute for state and local
law enforcement agencies that have fewer resources than federal law
enforcement.5 1 Nonetheless, there is concern across law enforcement and
intelligence agencies about "going dark," and these agencies at all levels
of government "would benefit if technological architectures did not
present a barrier to investigations." 52
Ultimately, law enforcement and intelligence agencies fear that they
will not be able to prevent terrorist attacks, investigate crimes, and
prosecute criminal activity without access to communications. FBI
Director James Comey, who has been very vocal in describing the "going
dark" problem has stated,

.

[u]nfortunately, the law hasn't kept pace with technology, and this
disconnect has created a significant public safety problem . .
Those charged with protecting our people aren't always able to
access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent
terrorism even with lawful authority. We have the legal authority
to intercept and access communications and information pursuant
to court order, but we often lack the technical ability to do so.53

Without a lawful access requirement, there will be crimes that go
unsolved that otherwise may have been solvable, and criminals will not
be brought to justice.
Currently, there is a double homicide case in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
that remains unsolved where the information on the victim's phone is
encrypted, and the phone cannot be opened without the password.54 The
(stating that encryption has hampered the CIA's ability to collect intelligence on ISIS); Michael
Isikoff, NSA Chief 'ParisWould not have Happened' Without EncryptedApps, YAHOO (Feb. 17,

2016),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/nsa-chief-paris-would-not-have-happened-without184040933.html (Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director
of NSA, warned encryption is making it more difficult for the NSA to intercept communications

and fulfill its mission).
51. Adam Segal & Alex Grigsby, How to break the deadlock over data encryption, WASH.
POST (Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.washington post.com/opinions/how-to-break-the-deadlock-

over-data-encryption/2016/03/13/e677fb78-dI 10-li e5-88cd753e80cd29ad story.html?utmterm=.0a2efccf86e8 ("The challenge of 'going dark' affects state
and local law enforcement the most: They are the least likely to have the resources and technical
capabilities to decrypt data relevant to an investigation.").
52. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 6.
53. James B. Comey, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a
Collision Course?, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/

speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course.
54. Aarti Shahani, Mom Asks: Who Will Unlock Murdered Daughter's iPhone?, NAT'L
PuB. RADIO (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/03/30/
472302719/mom-asks-who-will-unlock-her-murdered-daughters-iphone.
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victim was a pregnant woman who was shot and killed, and whose unborn
baby died." The victim's daughter was at the apartment and heard her
mother open the door and speak with a person at the door before the
daughter heard gunshots and hid in the bathroom.5 6 There was no sign of
forced entry at any other apartment in the complex, and the shooter did
not enter the victim's apartment. 57 Critically, the victim kept a detailed
diary on her phone, which could be useful for law enforcement
investigators.5 8 Investigators suspect the victim may have information
regarding the shooter in her diary because she was willing to open the
door for, and speak with, the shooter.59 However, law enforcement cannot
obtain access to the phone because it is locked, and the unencrypted data
stored on iCloud stopped backing up several months prior to the murder. 60
Thus, the heinous crime remains unsolved and law enforcement does not
yet even have a suspect.6 1
Also, the FBI has revealed that one of the terrorists who attempted to
attack Garland, Texas exchanged 109 encrypted messages with a terrorist
overseas. 62 The FBI cannot read the messages, though, because they were
encrypted.6 3 Additionally, government officials have stated the Paris
attackers likely used encrypted messaging services to plan the attacks.64
Following the Paris attacks in November 2015, CIA Director John
Brennan warned, "[tihere are a lot of technological capabilities that are
available right now that make it exceptionally difficult both technically
as well as legally for intelligence and security services to have the insight
they need to uncover it." 6 5 Terrorist recruiting, especially by the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), is increasingly occurring over encrypted
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id

62. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, I 14th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter Hearing on Oversight of the FBI] (Director Comey
explaining the increasing challenges the "going dark" problem presents and citing the encrypted

text messages of the Garland attacker as an example); David E. Sanger & Nicole Perloth, F.B.I.
Chief Says Texas Gunman Used Encryption to Text Overseas Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/fbi-chief-says-texas-gunman-used-encr
yption-to-text-overseas-terrorist.html.
63. Hearingon Oversight ofthe FBI, supra note 62.
64. Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, Paris Attackers Likely Used Encrypted Apps,
Officials Say, CNN (Dec. 17, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/politics/parisattacks-terrorists-encryption/.
65. Damian Paletta, Paris Attack Reopens U.S. Privacy vs. Security Debate, WALL ST. J.

(Nov. 16, 2015, 5:19 PM), http:/iblogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/11/16/paris-attack-reopens-u-sprivacy-vs-security-debate/.
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messaging services, too. 6 6 Director Comey has stated that ISIS operators
in Syria are "recruiting and tasking dozens of troubled Americans to kill
people, [using] a process that increasingly takes part through mobile
messaging apps that are end-to-end encrypted, communications that may
not be intercepted, despite judicial orders under the Fourth
Amendment." 6 7
Thus,
encryption
makes
the
government's
counterterrorism mission much more difficult.
1. How Extensive is the Law Enforcement Risk?
In 2015, a total of 4148 wiretaps were authorized by federal and state
judges. 6 8 Portable devices were the most frequently noted location in
wiretap applications, as mobile communications, such as text messaging
and application services, have become more prevalent.6 9 In fact, 96% of
all authorized wiretaps were designated as portable devices in 2015.70
These are the devices that are increasingly becoming encrypted by default
and several services are now using end-to-end encryption. Thus, as
encryption becomes more widespread, law enforcement agencies will
likely lose a robust source of evidence in criminal investigations and
prosecutions.
Law enforcement has not reported a large number of encounters with
encryption in recent years, but this is beginning to change. In 2014, just
26 wiretaps at the federal and state level were reported as being
encrypted, of which only 5 could not be decrypted. In 2015, just 13
wiretaps at the federal and state level were reported as being encrypted,
of which 11 could not be decrypted.7 2 These statistics do not tell the full
story, though, and understate the problem substantially. These data do not
include intercepts that are authorized by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which authorizes surveillance of
foreign intelligence and international terrorism. 73 Also, law enforcement
66.

Id.

67.

James Comey, Encryption, PublicSafety, and 'GoingDark', LAWFARE (July 6, 2015,

10:38 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ encryption-public-safety-and-going-dark.
68.
COURTS

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2015, UNITED STATES
(Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2015

[hereinafter Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2015].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2014, UNITED STATES
COURTS (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2014;
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2015, supra note 68. Encryption was

reported for the first time in 2015 in one federal wiretap that was conducted in 2014. Officials
were unable to decrypt the communication in that intercept.
72. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report2015, supra note 68.

73.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act, 50 U.S.C.A. ch. 36 (West 2016); Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2015, supra note 68. These data only include lawful
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agencies will not use valuable time and resources trying to obtain a
wiretap order when they know the communication will be encrypted and
therefore the wiretap will not be productive, which is increasingly the
case for connections between computers and websites, and for electronic
messaging services. 7 4 Thus, the statistics likely only represent the number
of times that law enforcement has encountered encryption that thwarts an
investigation when it is a surprise to law enforcement, because law
enforcement will choose another method of investigation if it knows it
will encounter encrypted communications when it obtains a wiretap
order.7 5
Cyrus Vance Jr., the Manhattan District Attorney, has testified that 74
cases in Manhattan from July 2014 to July 2015 were hindered because
law enforcement was unable to access information on a device because
of endpoint encryption. 7 6 Vance's office later updated this number to 423
devices lawfully seized from October 2014 to October 2016 in which law
enforcement's investigation was hampered by endpoint encryption.7 7
These data are just from one district in a single state. The Harris County
District Attorney's Office, in which Houston, Texas is located,
encountered between 8-10 encrypted devices every month in its criminal
investigations in 2016.78 The Suffolk County District Attorney's Office,
in which Boston, Massachusetts is located, encountered 151 encrypted
devices in its criminal investigations during 2016.79 Law enforcement
officials in Los Angeles, California were unable to access over 300
encrypted devices during criminal investigations in 2016.80 And,
Wisconsin's Department of Justice encountered 68 encrypted devices in
criminal investigations in 2016.1
Further, in August 2016, Director Comey stated the FBI was unable
wiretaps authorized under Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012).
74. Stewart Baker, Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast: The Second Annual Triple Entente Beer
Summit, LAWFARE (Feb. 23, 2016), https://lawfareblog.com/steptoe-cyberlaw-podcast-secondannual-triple-entente-beer-summit.

75.

Id.

76. Andy Greenberg, Manhattan DA: iPhone Crypto Locked Out Cops 74 Times, WIRED
(July 8, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/manhattan-da-iphone-crypto-foiled-

cops-74-times/.
77. MANHATrAN DIsRCT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC
SAFETY 8 (2016), http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Report/20on%20Smartphone%
20Encryption%20and%2OPublic%2OSafety:%2OAn%20Update.pdf, David Kravets, Manhattan
DA Demands Congress Require Mobile Phone Backdoors, ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 18, 2015),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11 /manhattan-da-demands-congress-require-mobilephone-backdoors/.
78. MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATToRNEY's OFFICE, supra note 77, at 9-10.

79.
80.
8 1.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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to access 650 out of 5000 electronic devices that investigators attempted

to search between October 2015 and August 2016.82 In March 2017,
Director Comey updated these statistics and reported that the FBI was
unable to access 1200 out of 2800 electronic devices that local police and
federal agents sent to the FBI to search for evidence between October
2016 and December 2016.83 This indicates that law enforcement may
encounter encryption quite frequently and that the problem may be large.
2. Is the Problem Overstated?
A recent report from Harvard University's Berkman Center for
Internet and Society, "Don't Panic," argues that the "going dark" problem
may be overstated. 4 Encryption, especially end-to-end encryption, may
not become as widespread as law enforcement and intelligence officials
fear.8 5 Furthermore, some believe that other means of surveillance will
replace the information that is lost because of encryption, and that we are
actually currently living in the "golden age for surveillance." 86
End-to-end encryption may be unlikely to be widely adopted by
industry because it conflicts with many companies' business models.8 7
Many companies rely on advertising revenue to subsidize the free content
and services produced. Advertising is very dependent on user data for
the production of targeted advertisements based on the user's Internet
behavior and searches. 89 End-to-end encryption would make user
information unidentifiable, which would conflict with this business
82.

Paul Elias, FBI ChiefCallsfor National Talk over Encryption vs. Safety, ASSOCIATED

PRESS (Aug. 5, 2016, 9:53 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7efad5f542284872b73a0a78ba
052824/fbi-chief-calls-national-talk-over-encryption-vs-safety.
83. Tom Winter et al., Comey: FBI Couldn't Access Hundreds of Devices Because of
Encryption, NBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/comey-fbi-

couldn-t-access-hundreds-devices-because-encryption-n730646; James B. Comey, Dir., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, Keynote Address at the Intelligence Studies Project Spring Symposium:
Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland (Mar. 23, 2017), http://intelligencestudies.
utexas.edu/events/itemi/560-isp-spring-conference.
84. See generally OLSEN ET AL., supra note 3.

85.

Id. at 11.

86. Id. at 13-15 (discussing the surveillance opportunities that the Internet of Things may
present); Swire & Ahman, supra note 23, at 463-73 (arguing that we are currently in the "golden
age for surveillance").
87. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.

88.

IdatlO-11.

89. See Create Gmail Ads with Templates, GOOGLE (last visited Aug. 1, 2016),
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/6105478
(discussing
targeted
Gmail
advertisements); How to target Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK (last visited Aug. 1, 2016),
https://www.facebook.com/business/alonline-sales/ad-targeting-details (boasting 89% accuracy
for targeted advertising campaigns based on Facebook's information on users' location,
demographics, interests, and behaviors).
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model. 90 Thus, companies would likely lose revenue if they employed
end-to-end encryption. 9 1 Furthermore, cloud computing moves data and
software and depends on ubiquitous connectivity, which allows the data
and software to be accessed through multiple platforms. 9 2 This could not
be done if end-to-end encryption was employed because the companies
need access to the plaintext data. 9 3 Therefore, end-to-end encryption may
not be ubiquitous in the near future, but endpoint encryption does not face
such obstacles and will likely become more widely adopted. However,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has disputed
that end-to-end encryption is unlikely to pose a significant problem. 9 4
ODNI believes that there is already a trend developing of companies
implementing end-to-end encryption and adversaries have already begun
using these tools to avoid surveillance.9 5 Even if end-to-end encryption
does not become widespread, it may still pose a significant threat if
enough sophisticated malicious actors utilize products that adopt end-t6end encryption.
The Internet of Things (loT) will greatly alter surveillance and present
new opportunities to intercept information. 9 6 loT is the network of
appliances and products, such as televisions, refrigerators, light bulbs,
cameras, door locks, cars, watches, and other wearables that are
connected and transmit data. 97 As loT becomes more widespread, as it is
expected to do, this will enable the government to gain new avenues to
have access to communications and data, especially metadata. 9 8 ODNI
strongly disputes that loT and metadata could fill the gap of collection
left by widespread encryption. 9 Although metadata is unencrypted and
will likely remain unencrypted-and provides a great deal of surveillance
data already-it does not provide the content of communications. 0 0
Metadata does not benefit law enforcement and intelligence agencies that
are striving to prevent terrorist attacks and investigate and prosecute
90.

OLSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 11-12.
93. Id.
94.

See Letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Senator Ron

Wyden (May 5, 2016), 1-2, https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=3F716160-095E420E-93F3-849453EB61 B2&download=1 (asserting that the increased prevalence of encryption
has already hampered law enforcement and intelligence collection activities and that the problem

is only growing).
95. Id.
96.
97.

OLSEN ETAL.,supra note 3, at 12-13.
Id. at 13.

98. Id. Metadata, such as e-mail addresses and telephone numbers, is the data that describes
and gives information about other data.
99. Letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Senator Ron Wyden,
supra note 94, at 1-2.
100. Comey, supra note 53.
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crimes in the same manner as actual content because the substance of
communications remain unknown. 1 0 ' This diminished usefulness is
further exacerbated when expediency is important, which is often the case
with counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, many state and local law
enforcement agencies will not have the resources and technology to
conduct surveillance through loT, and there will be many privacy
implications from loT that will prohibit law enforcement and intelligence
agencies from lawfully collecting much of this data.' 02
B. PrivateSector and Security Concerns
The private sector and security officials have expressed numerous
reasons why they oppose a lawful access requirement.1 03 The private
sector and some cryptographers fear that the technological architecture
that would guarantee law enforcement and intelligence agencies access
would compromise user security and privacy.1 04 Building in lawful access
would increase systems' complexities, which would increase
vulnerabilities because the new feature could interact with existing
features in unintended and unknown ways. 0 5 Also, the keys that would
need to be retained by the companies, government, or third party would
become targets for illicit actors to attack.1 0 6 For example, between 2004
and 2005, an unknown party exploited the intercept features of Greece's
largest telephone service provider, which were designed to provide lawful
access, and listened in on the calls of top Greek government officials
before finally being detected.1 07 Thus, user security could be put at
greater risk with a lawful access requirement. This is also very worrisome
for the U.S. government because the United States is heavily dependent
on cyber infrastructure, which makes it vulnerable to cyber-threats.
Additionally, surveillance by governments that have less robust legal
processes as the United States would be made easier by the new
101. Id.; Letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Senator Ron
Wyden, supra note 94, at 1-2.

102.

Letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Senator Ron Wyden,

supra note 94, at 1-2.
103. The government is not a monolithic actor in this debate, and several former national
security and intelligence officials oppose a lawful access requirement.
104. See generally HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING
INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS (2015)

(arguing against a lawful access requirement because of cybersecurity concerns).

105.
106.
107.

Id. at 15-17.
Id.
Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 29,

2007), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair (detailing the surreptitious
wiretapping of Vodafone Greece that allowed the communications of prominent Greek politicians

to be intercepted by hackers).
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technological architecture because U.S. products are used around the
world.' 8 This would conflict with America's foreign policy interests at
times when strong encryption would be favored because dissidents could
use it to challenge authoritarian regimes. During the Arab Spring, for
example, the State Department provided dissidents with encryption tools
to help them shield their identities from repressive governments that were
seeking to uncover those participating in organized protests.1 09 This type
of effort would be more difficult to accomplish if the United States
mandated lawful access. Further, because U.S. products are used around
the world, mandating lawful access would allow autocratic regimes to
infringe on their citizens' privacy rights and enable these regimes to
crackdown on dissidents. The United States would not have as much
leverage in condemning such actions by repressive regimes if it
demanded lawful access too because other countries would argue that
they were legitimately pursuing law enforcement and intelligence goals
through their actions. The United States would be able to argue that other
countries' activities and surveillance laws are over-broad and repressive,
though. In addition, authoritarian regimes would likely be able to bypass
endpoint encryption regardless of whether lawful access was required if
they have detained the user of the device because these regimes may
resort to torture to obtain the keys to the device to find the desired
information.
Also, the United States mandated lawful access would not be globally
pervasive. There are 546 encrypted products from outside the United
States."1 0 Thus, sophisticated illicit actors would be able to encrypt their
communications regardless of whether the United States mandated lawful
access.' However, most illicit actors are not sophisticated. Many
criminals end up getting caught because of flawed plans or carelessness.
Therefore, the shift to overseas encryption products would likely not be
widespread among illicit actors. In addition, U.S. companies dominate
the market for technologies in which encryption capabilities are
available.11 2 It is unknown, and perhaps doubtful, whether foreign
108. See Lu Wang, Tech GiantsAre Now GlobalStock Leaders, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2016,
11:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2016-02-02/facebook-ascent-cements-

reign-of-u-s-tech-in-global-stock-ranks (discussing how the demand for U.S. technology products
around the world has spurred U.S. technology companies to become the largest companies in the

world).
109. See Andrea Peterson, The NSA is Trying to Crack Tor. The State Departmentis Helping
Pay for It, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2013/10/05/the-nsa-is-trying-to-crack-tor-the-state-department-is-helping-pay-for-it/ (reporting
on the State Department's effort to teach activists and journalists to use Tor and other counter-

surveillance technologies during the Arab Spring).
110.

BRUCE SCH4NEIER ET AL., A WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS 2 (2016).

111. Id. at6.
112. See Wang, supra note 108 (detailing the prominence of U.S. technologies around the
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companies may be able to significantly expand their market share if U.S.
companies are forced to comply with a lawful access requirement.
The greatest potential harm from requiring lawful access likely stems
from the possible decrease in the market share and economic viability of
U.S. companies. U.S. intelligence has had a tremendous advantage in
gathering information because a great deal of global communications
transit in the United States." 3 Following Edward Snowden's
unauthorized disclosures of intelligence activities, foreign consumers
have become concerned about U.S. surveillance.11 4 Foreign consumers
may not want to use American products or online services if they believe
their communications would be accessible to U.S. law enforcement or
intelligence agencies." 5 This could decrease U.S. companies' market
share, which would mean less information would be transiting U.S.
networks. Thus, U.S. intelligence agencies would have a more difficult
time obtaining information. Also, a decrease in U.S. companies' market
share would hurt their economic viability. U.S. technology companies
have already lost between $35 and $180 billion in revenue over the 3year period following the Snowden disclosures.116
Additionally, U.S. companies face a tremendous threat from the theft
of intellectual property through cyber espionage. General Keith
Alexander, the former Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director
of NSA, has stated that cyber espionage has resulted in the "greatest
transfer of wealth in history." 1 7 U.S. companies lose about $250 billion
per year because of intellectual property theft, global cybercrime costs
world).
113. John Markoff, Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S., N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 29, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/business/30pipes.html?pagewanted=print& r-0
(noting
General Michael Hayden's, former Director of the CIA and Director of the NSA, testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee stating that "[b]ecause of the nature of global
telecommunications, we are playing with a tremendous home-field advantage, and we need to

exploit that edge").
114.

See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Revelations ofN.S.A. Spying Cost US. Tech Companies,

N.Y. TuIES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-fromsnowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html(discussing the increased skepticism by
foreign consumers of U.S. technology products following the Snowden disclosures).
115.
116.

See, e.g., id.
DANIEL CASTRO, How MUCH WILL PRISM COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING

INDUSTRY? 3 (2013) (calculating that U.S. technology companies would lose up to $35 billion
between 2013-2016 following Snowden's unauthorized disclosures about the NSA's intelligence
programs); James Staten, The Cost of PRISM Will Be Larger Than ITIF Projects, FORRESTER

(Aug. 14, 2013), http://blogs.forrester.com/jamesstaten/13-08-14-the-cost of prism will be
larger than itif projects (estimating that U.S. technology companies could lose up to $180 billion
between 2013-2016 because of disclosures about NSA programs).
117. Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Cyber Command Commander and NSA Director,
Cybersecurity and American Power, Address at the American Enterprise Institute (July 9, 2012),
http://www.aei.org/events/cybersecurity-and-american-power/.
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companies about $114 billion per year worldwide, and $388 billion is lost
globally when the costs of down time are taken into account." 8 The threat
of intellectual property theft and cybercrime could be exacerbated by a
lawful access requirement that makes systems more vulnerable.
The decreased economic viability that could result from a lawful
access requirement would diminish the economic strength of the United
States, which is an important aspect of the role of the United States in the
world. In 2014, Internet-related companies in the United States generated
$966.2 billion in revenue, which accounted for 6% of real Gross
Domestic Product." 9 Economic strength enables countries to have
political and military power and to have strong geopolitical influence.
Therefore, it is important to consider the economic interests of U.S.
businesses when considering whether a lawful access requirement is
appropriate.
Many who oppose a lawful access requirement still recognize that law
enforcement and intelligence agencies would be harmed. Instead of a
lawful access requirement, they propose that law enforcement and
intelligence agencies be granted greater authorities, resources, and
capabilities to obtain the necessary information to keep the country secure
through alternative means. A prominent alternative to a lawful access
requirement would be for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
focus on legally exploiting vulnerabilities in targeted devices to conduct
surveillance.

120

1. Is Legally Exploiting Vulnerabilities a Good Alternative to a Lawful
Access Requirement?
Legally exploiting vulnerabilities could help law enforcement and
intelligence agencies obtain the information they need without mandating
a lawful access requirement. Those who advocate for this approach
believe that "the technique is preferable for conducting wiretaps against
targets when compared to other possible methods of wiretapping," such
as a lawful access requirement.121 Another variation of this approach is
that law enforcement and intelligence agencies should have the ability to
require companies to install software on consumers' devices that "will
copy and forward all communications that are sent or received through

118.

Id.

119. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, MEASURING THE U.S. INTERNET SECTOR 5 (2015).
120. See Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark & Susan Landau, Lawful Hacking:
Using Existing Vulnerabilitiesfor Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.

1, 22 (2014) (arguing investigators should focus on exploiting vulnerabilities instead of mandating
a lawful access requirement).

121. Id. at 64.
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that device" to government authorities.1 2 2 However, exploiting
vulnerabilities raises serious legal, business, transparency, and scalability
issues.
If the government must seek the technical assistance of a company to
push software to a device to facilitate surveillance, this must adhere to
the technical assistance provisions of either FISA-for cases involving
foreign powers and agents of foreign powers-or the Wiretap Act-for
criminal cases. 123 FISA states that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) shall direct that,
upon the request of the applicant, a specified communication or
other common carrier, landlord, custodian, or other specified
person ... furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities,
or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic
surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and
produce a minimum of interference with the services that such
carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing that target
of electronic surveillance.1 24
Similarly, the Wiretap Act requires that upon a court order,
a provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord,
custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all
information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services that such service provider, landlord,
custodian, or person is according the person whose
communications are to be intercepted. 125
Although both of these statutes are very broad, and the FISA provision
is largely uninterpreted, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Wiretap Act's technical assistance provision presents a potential
difficulty for the government to be able to compel a company to push

122.

Herb Lin, A Biometric Approach as a PartialStep Forwardin the Encryption Debate,

LAWFARE (Dec. 3, 2015, 3:22 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/biometric-approach-partialstep-forward-encryption-debate. Companies already push software updates to consumers and this
variation of exploiting vulnerabilities would allow government authorities to create a vulnerability

it could exploit on a specific device through this mechanism. Id.
123. See Benjamin Wittes, Be Careful What You Wish For: Device Hacking and the Law,
LAWFARE (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/be-careful-what-you-wish-

device-hacking-and-law (raising legal uncertainties surrounding the pushing of software to
devices to facilitate surveillance).
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2012).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012).
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software to a device to facilitate surveillance. 126 In determining that a
company had to assist law enforcement in the installation of a pen register
device,1 27 Supreme Court in New York Telephone Co. reasoned that,
it can hardly be contended that the Company, a highly regulated
public utility with a duty to serve the public, had a substantial
interest in not providing assistance. Certainly the use of pen
registers is by no means offensive to it. The Company concedes
that it regularly employs such devices without court order for the
purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and
preventing violations of law. It also agreed to supply the FBI with
all the information required to install its own pen registers. Nor
was the District Court's order in any way burdensome. The order
provided that the Company be fully reimbursed at prevailing rates,
and compliance with it required minimal effort on the part of the,
Company and no disruption to its operations.1 2 8
This indicates that courts will consider whether a company is a public
utility or private entity, whether the company normally performs the
activity the government is asking in its course of business, and whether
the request is unduly burdensome for the company in determining
whether a company must push software to a device to facilitate
surveillance. Courts could consider the fact that companies regularly push
software updates to consumers and that the government will compensate
companies financially 2 9 for the assistance as indicative that companies
126.

These provisions do not require technical assistance in decrypting signal, which would

solve the "going dark" problem, because of the interaction with CALEA's exception that "[a]
telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government's
ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the
encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to

decrypt the communication." 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3) (2012).
127.

A pen register is a "device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other

impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information reasonable likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication,
provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication."

18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2012).
128. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (requiring the government to provide compensation for
assistance in intercepting communications); 18 U.S.C. § 3124(c) (2012) (requiring the
government to provide compensation for the facilitation of the installation of pen register and trap

and trace devices); 18 U.S.C.

§ 3125(d) (2012) (requiring the government to provide

compensation for the facilitation of emergency pen register and trap and trace device installation);

50 U.S.C.

§ 1802(a)(4) (2012) (requiring the government to provide compensation to carriers for

furnishing aid in carrying out electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General without

a court order); 50 U.S.C.

§ 1805 (c)(2)(D) (2012) (requiring the government to provide

compensation for the provision of technical assistance in cases involving foreign powers and

agents of foreign powers); 50 U.S.C.

§ 1824(c)(2)(D) (2012) (requiring the government to
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must be forced to provide assistance to the government in pushing
software to a device to facilitate surveillance. However, courts may
determine that private companies that do not have a public service
obligation and that do not engage in pushing software updates to
consumers that intentionally create vulnerabilities would be unduly
burdened by degrading the companies' trust relationship with its
consumers.
The Eastern District of New York in In re Apple, Inc. came to the
latter conclusion in ruling that Apple could not be compelled to bypass
its endpoint encryption on a defendant's device by the All Writs Act,1 30
which has come to be understood as authorizing a federal court to issue a
writ directing a third-party to the underlying litigation to provide
reasonable technical assistance to the government to facilitate the
execution of a valid search warrant. 13 1 The court reasoned that Apple, a
private company (not a public utility with a duty to serve the public), had
an interest in not complying with the government because of its reliance
on its reputation as a company that safeguards user data. 13 2 Further, the
court determined that
unlike the pen register at issue in N Y Tel. Co., the assistance the
government [sought] here-bypassing a security measure that
Apple affirmatively markets to its customers-is not something
that Apple would normally do in the conduct of its own business
and is, at least now, plainly "offensive to it."1 3 3
Finally, the court determined that bypassing the endpoint encryption
diverted man-hours, software, and hardware from Apple's normal
business operation and therefore constituted an unreasonable burden.1 34
The opinion in In re Apple, Inc. indicates that when faced with the
compensate a person for facilitating a physical search); 50 U.S.C.

§ 1842(d)(2)(B)(iii) (2012)

(requiring the government to provide compensation for reasonable expenses incurred in assisting

with the installation of pen register and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(j) (West 2016) (requiring the
government to compensate a person for reasonable expenses incurred for producing tangible
things or providing information, facilities, or assistance in gaining access to certain business
records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations); 50 U.S.C. §
1881a(h)(2) (2012) (requiring the government to compensate electronic service providers for
assisting the government to acquire communications related to foreign intelligence information);
50 U.S.C. § 188lb(c)(5)(d) (2012) (requiring the government to provide compensation at the
prevailing rate to electronic service providers for assisting in the acquisition of communications

and data of targeted U.S. persons outside the United States).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
131. In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 364-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
132. Id. at 369.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 370.
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question of whether a company should be compelled under FISA or the
Wiretap Act to provide assistance to the government in pushing software
to a device to facilitate surveillance, a court may similarly determine that
such assistance would constitute an undue burden. Even if courts
determine that companies must provide assistance to the government in
pushing software to a device to facilitate surveillance, this could seriously
degrade the trust relationship consumers have with the companies. This
could lead consumers to stop updating their software, which in turn would
degrade security because companies typically push software updates to
consumers in part to improve the security of systems and applications and
fix vulnerabilities. Thus, consumers could actually be left more
vulnerable to cyber-threats from malicious actors if they chose to stop
receiving software updates out of fear-whether legitimate or not-that
the updates may be facilitating surveillance.
Also, transparency with the public will be diminished if the
government is forced to rely on legally exploiting vulnerabilities.1 3 5
Currently, companies provide transparency reports regarding government
requests for data, including FISA orders after the passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act permitted such disclosures.1 3 6 The government also
provides reports on FISA orders and court orders for communications
interception.13 7 These levels of transparency are unlikely to occur with
the government's exploitation of vulnerabilities because companies
would likely be reticent to disclose the number of vulnerabilities being
exploited in their products, which they would rather like to tout as being
secure.
Further, some advocates of this approach argue that the government
should disclose all, or nearly all, vulnerabilities discovered to companies
so that these vulnerabilities may be fixed.1 3 8 While this would help
companies to further improve the security of their systems and
135. See Marshall Erwin, Lawful HackingAfter the EncryptionDebate, JusT SECURITY (Oct.
15, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/26849/lawful-hacking-encryption-debate/
(advocating that legally exploiting vulnerabilities is a better alternative to a lawful access
requirement, but acknowledging the potential for a loss of transparency).

136.

50 U.S.C.A.

§ 1874(a) (West 2016) (permitting companies to disclose information

regarding FISA orders and national security letters). See, e.g., APPLE, INC., REPORT ON
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REQUESTS: JULY 1-DECEMBER 31, 2015 (2016), https://www.apple.
com/legal/privacy/transparency/requests-20150914-en.pdf (detailing government requests for

information).
137.

See,

e.g.,

DIR.

OF NAT'L

INTELLIGENCE,

STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY

REPORT

REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES (2016) (disclosing statistics from 2015 of
the government's use of national security authorities); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Wiretap Report 2015, supra note 68 (presenting statistics on lawful wiretaps).
138. See Sara Sorcher & Malena Carollo, Influencers: FBI Should Disclose San Bernardino
iPhone Security Hole to Apple, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Mar. 24, 2016), http://passcode.
csmonitor.com/influencers-applevsfbi (citing several experts advocating for vulnerabilities to be

disclosed as quickly as possible).
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applications, law enforcement and intelligence agencies would in turn be
unable to exploit those same vulnerabilities to produce information in the
future.1 3 9 Certainly, the government's role in vulnerability disclosure is
already a hotly debated issue, and forcing law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to rely more heavily on exploiting vulnerabilities
will only add to the complexity of this difficult issue. 14 0
Finally, relying on legally exploiting vulnerabilities is not yet a
practical approach on a large-scale. This approach would likely not be
able to provide the same level of data available for collection by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies as is currently available. In
addition, it is very doubtful that state and local authorities have the
technical sophistication and resources to develop the necessary
vulnerabilities or to compensate companies for their assistance. 14 1
While legally exploiting vulnerabilities does present opportunities for
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the approach presents
numerous difficulties as a replacement for a lawful access requirement,
and likely requires Congress to pass comprehensive legislation to permit
and regulate its use. Thus, legally exploiting vulnerabilities does not
present a sufficient alternative to a lawful access requirement.

139. See Michael Daniel, Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber
Vulnerabilities, WHITE HOUSE: WHAT'S HAPPENING (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/28/heartbleed-understanding-when-we-disclose-cybe
r-vulnerabilities ("Disclosing a vulnerability can mean that we forego an opportunity to collect
crucial intelligence that could thwart a terrorist attack[,] stop the theft of our nation's intellectual
property, or even discover more dangerous vulnerabilities that are being used by hackers or other
adversaries to exploit our networks.").
140. Compare Andrew Crocker, What to Do About Lawless Government Hacking and the
Weakening of Digital Security, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOuND. (Aug.
1, 2016),

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/what-do-about-lawless-government-hacking-and-weaken
ing-digital-security (arguing in favor of reforming how the government exploits vulnerabilities)
with Dave Aitel, Slow Down On Lawful Hacking Frameworksand Fixes, LAWFARE (Aug. 4,2016,

3:35 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/slow-down-lawful-hacking-frameworks-and-fixes
(expressing concern with the current move towards advocating significant reforms in the policies
and laws governing exploiting vulnerabilities because the technology is still rapidly developing
in this field and will therefore likely outpace any concrete policy efforts).
141. See Hearing on Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies, supra note 48, at 2 (statement of Rep. Tim Griffin, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security) (acknowledging that state and local law enforcement

agencies do not have the same financial resources or technical expertise as federal law
enforcement, and encouraging others to take this into account in analyzing the "going dark"
problem); Robin Hanson, Can Wiretaps Remain Cost Effective?, COMM. OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994,
at 13, 13-15 (recognizing that police are price sensitive to the cost of surveillance activities and
must factor cost into the decision whether to pursue that method of investigation).
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2. Would Security and Privacy Really Be Compromised by a Lawful
Access Requirement?
Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and cofounder of Lawfare, has raised the point that major Internet companies
currently have the ability to decrypt information.1 42 Google has the ability
to decrypt Gmail and Gchat communications because this allows Google
to target users for advertisements. 1 4 3 Also, Gmail is able to filter spam,
which can contain malware, because Google can read emails'plaintext,
which would not be possible with end-to-end encryption.
Further,
Google offers the full text search of files stored in the cloud, which
requires access to plaintext, too, and could not occur with end-to-end
encryption. 14 5 There have not been security issues with Google's services
thus far. 14 6 Despite a lack of security problems, Google has announced
that it will offer a messaging application, Allo, that will use opt-in (not
default) end-to-end encryption, and video calling application, Duo, that
will use default end-to-end encryption. 14 7 Facebook's Messenger used to
be able to be decrypted by Facebook.1 4 8 Although the company has
started testing opt-in (not default) end-to-end encryption for Messenger,
Facebook has not indicated this move is because the service was
insecure. 14 9 In addition, Apple continues to enable iCloud backups to
occur in a manner that can be decrypted. Once again, there have not been
security issues with the service."5 o Thus, there does not seem be evidence
that these major Internet companies' services are insecure because they
have the ability to decrypt information. Some of the fears of insecurity
seem to actually stem from a disdain for lawful surveillance. However,
lawful surveillance is not a cybersecurity risk.
Lawful surveillance is only conducted by the United States following
rigorous legal scrutiny. The government conducts surveillance of the
142. Benjamin Wittes, Five HardEncryptionQuestions, LAWFARE (Aug. 7,2015,2:14 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/five-hard-encryption-questions
[hereinafter
Wittes,
Five Hard
Encryption Questions].

143. Id.
144. Andy Greenberg, After 3 Years, Why Gmail's End-to-End Encryption is Still Vapor,
WIRED (Feb. 28, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/3-years-gmails-end-endencryption-still-vapor/.
145. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.
146. Wittes, Five HardEncryption Questions, supra note 142.
147. Andy Greenberg, With Allo and Duo, Google FinallyEncrypts ConversationsEnd-to-

End, WIRED (May 18, 2016, 3:23 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/allo-duo-google-finallyencrypts-conversations-end-end/.
148. Wittes, Five HardEncryption Questions, supra note 142.
149. Id; Andy Greenberg, 'Secret Conversations:' End-to-End Encryption Comes to
Facebook Messenger, WIRED (July 8, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/07/secretconversations-end-end-encryption-facebook-messenger-arrived/.
150. Wittes, Five HardEncryption Questions, supra note 142.
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content of communications pursuant to Title III and FISA, and obtains
stored communications pursuant to the Stored Communications Act
(SCA),"' which is part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).1 5 2 Under Title III, in order to obtain a court order to intercept
wire, oral, and electronic communications, the government is required to
establish:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit [an enumerated
crime]; (b) there is probable cause that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous; [and] (d) ... there is probable cause for belief that the
facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or
electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or
are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such
offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used
by such person.1 5 3
Under FISA, the government is required to establish probable cause
that the "target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power"; probable cause that "each of the facilities or
places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is
about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"; and
that the proposed minimization procedures 5 4 meet the statutory
requirements. ss The government may compel the disclosure of the
contents of stored wire or electronic communication "that is in electronic
storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and
eighty days or less" by an electronic communication service only upon
receipt of a warrant under the SCA.1 5 6 Also, under the SCA, the
government may compel a provider of remote computing service to
disclose the contents of stored wire or electronic communication with a
warrant, or by obtaining an administrative subpoena or court order and

151.
152.
(2012).
153.

Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C.
18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(3) (2012).

154. Minimization procedures are a set of rules that dictate how a government agency will
limit the accessibility, retention, and dissemination of inadvertently acquired material concerning

U.S. persons who are not the target of the surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012).
155. Id. § 1805(a).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). An electronic communications system provides customers
"the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." Id. § 2510(15).
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providing prior notice to the subscriber or customer."' To obtain a court
order under the SCA, the government must "offer[] specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.""' These statutory requirements ensure that people are
provided robust privacy protections whenever their Fourth Amendment
rights may be implicated. The concerns that user security and privacy
would be compromised and that intellectual property theft would be
exacerbated may be overblown.
3. Is There Really Consumer Pressure Driving Companies Toward
More Encryption?
A lawful access requirement's potential harm to the market share and
economic viability of U.S. companies is the strongest argument for not
mandating such a requirement. Certainly, the Snowden disclosures had a
negative impact on U.S. companies in their immediate aftermath, but
confidence in U.S. companies seems to have rebounded. In the fourth
quarter of 2016, Facebook reported that it had 1.86 billion users who
logged on at least once a month.' 5 9 This is up from the 1.16 billion users
who logged on at least once a month in the second quarter of 2013, when
Snowden first disclosed NSA programs. 1 6 0 In 2015, 70% of Facebook
users logged on daily, which is an increase from the 63% who logged on
daily in Aurst 2013, in the immediate aftermath of the Snowden
disclosures.' Also, Google announced in February 2016 that Gmail has
over one billion active users. 16 2 This is an increase from the 900 million
active users Gmail had in 2015, when it became the most popular email
service in the United States, and from the 425 million active users Gmail

157. Id. § 2703(b). A remote computing service provides "computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communications system." Id. § 2711(2).

158.

Id

§ 2703(d).

159. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter 2016 (in
Millions), STATISTA (2016), http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-

active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
160. Id.
161.
2015),

Maeve Duggan, The Demographics of Social Media Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 19,
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/

(analyzing 2015 statistics regarding social media usage); Maeve Duggan et al., Frequency of
Social Media Use, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan.

9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/

09/frequency-of-social-media-use-2/ (analyzing 2014 and 2013 statistics regarding social media
usage).
162. Frederic Lardinois, Gmail Now Has More Than IB Monthly Active Users,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 1, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/ 01/gmail-now-has-more-than-lbmonthly-active-users/.
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had in 2012, prior to the Snowden disclosures. 163 Of these Gmail users,
75% accessed their accounts on mobile devices, too.M" These statistics
do not indicate that consumers are deeply distrustful of U.S. companies
and refuse to use U.S. products and services.
Further, a recent study surveying 1510 participants, including both
information technology security experts and non-experts, from the United
States, United Kingdom, and Germany, found that privacy and security
only play a minor role in people's decisions to use a particular mobile
instant messenger.1 65 The primary reason that participants gave for using
a mobile instant messenger was whether friends were using the
messenger:1 66 46.1% of participants from the United States, 48.2% of
participants from the United Kingdom, and 54.9% of participants from
Germany stated this was the main reason they used a particular mobile
instant messenger. 167 On the other hand, only a small percentage of
participants stated the main reason they used a mobile instant messenger
was because of privacy and security.1 68 Only 5.6% of participants from
the United States, 3.4% of participants from the United Kingdom, and
13.1% of participants from Germany stated this was the main reason that
they used a particular mobile instant messenger.1 69
Consumer pressure may not truly be driving the move toward more
encryption; instead, companies may be pressuring each other to move in
this direction. Consumers seem to care more about being able to be
connected to friends, having easy to use and reliable products, and having
sleek interfaces and useful applications, and seem willing to sacrifice
some privacy and security in exchange. If consumer pressure is not
driving this shift, then perhaps the fear that U.S. companies will lose
market share and that the economic viability of U.S. companies would be
hurt by a lawful access requirement is overstated. As long as U.S.
companies continue to lead in the areas consumers care about the most,
while still making the most secure products and services possible that
comply with a lawful access requirement, U.S. companies will likely
continue to dominate the technology market.

163.

Id.

164.
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Users, 75% On Mobile,

TECHCRUNCH (May 28, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/05/28/gmail-now-has-900m-activeusers-75-on-mobile/.
165.
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C. The U.S. Should Mandate a Lawful Access Requirement
There should be a lawful access requirement. Encryption presents
great harms to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Without a
lawful access requirement, lawful surveillance would become extremely
difficult and cyberspace would become a large ungoverned space. 170 This
would drastically limit the ability to intercept terrorist communications,
which would inhibit the ability to prevent attacks, and would hinder law
enforcement from performing its mission of investigating and
prosecuting crimes. Ultimately, crimes would go unsolved, criminals
would not be brought to justice, and the United States and its allies would
be made more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
While some cybersecurity concerns and vulnerabilities may arise from
creating the architecture to provide lawful access, the fact that companies
currently have the ability to decrypt information demonstrates that this
can in fact be done in a secure manner. Authoritarian regimes already
invade their citizens' privacy and seek to crackdown on dissidents, and
will implement access requirements of their own regardless of what the
United States chooses to do. The United States can still be critical of other
nations' human rights abuses and less robust legal processes even if the
United States implements a lawful access requirement. Furthermore,
while some criminals and terrorists will find ways to use encrypted
communication no matter what, many criminals and terrorists will not be
sophisticated enough to do this. The United States could use other
resources and focus on legally exploiting vulnerabilities in targeted
devices to conduct surveillance on these more sophisticated actors, which
is more feasible than trying to focus on legally exploiting vulnerabilities
for all criminal and terrorist targets. Finally, U.S. companies have
rebounded since the Snowden disclosures, and do not appear to face
significant market share and economic vulnerabilities from a lawful
access requirement. Thus, the United States should mandate a lawful
access requirement, and it is technologically feasible to securely achieve
this.
V. HOW A LAWFUL ACCESS REQUIREMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED

There are numerous techniques through which a lawful access
requirement could be achieved. Technological innovations could be
170. See Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on Encryption and Going Dark, PartII: The Debate
on the Merits, LAWFARE (July 12, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-

encryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debate-merits

(without

surveillance

capabilities,

law

enforcement would be largely unable to investigate illicit behavior in cybersapce, which would

allow malicious actors to conduct activities unbridled).
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developed, users could be given greater control, or industry incentives
could be altered through conditional liability protections.
A. Possible Technological Innovations
1. Weaken Encryption Systems or Renew the Push for a Key
Escrow System
While weakening encryption systems would create vulnerabilities that
could be exploited by illicit actors in addition to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, there are several technological means that could be
used in a secure manner. The government could once again seek to
institute a key escrow system, in which the government or trusted third
party would hold the keys. A key escrow system would not weaken
encryption and the keys would be made accessible only upon lawful
process, which would assuage civil liberties concerns. However, a key
escrow system would increase the surface area of the underlying system,
which would increase the system's susceptibility to attacks."'
2. Mandatory Biometric Encryption
Paul Rosenzweig, a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group and former
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Homeland
Security, has pointed out that mandatory biometric encryption would
allow for strong endpoint encryption while providing lawful access. 172
This strategy would require that manufacturers use encryption with a
biometric lock, such as a fingerprint, rather than a password. 73 Biometric
encryption provides more robust security for users than passwords, but is
likely not protected by the Fifth Amendment, unlike passwords.
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects an individual from being
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 74 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this as protecting an individual from being
compelled to give testimony that is self-incriminating. 175 Cases typically
focus on whether a statement is testimonial, as compulsion and the
incriminating nature of documents are rarely in doubt. The Supreme
Court has held that it is testimonial implicating the Fifth Amendment
when the government compels an individual to use the contents of his

171. CHERTOFF GROUP, supra note 1, at 5-6.
172. Paul Rosenzweig, Encryption, Biometrics, and the Status Quo Ante, LAWFARE (July 6,
2015, 10:29 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/encryption-biometrics-and-status-quo-ante.

173.
174.
175.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
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own mind to communicate a fact or disclose information.17 6 In In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, the
government sought to compel the defendant to decrypt and produce the
contents of hard drives that the government suspected contained child
pornography.1 7 7 However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that compelled password decryption violates the Fifth Amendment
because it involves requiring the defendant to use the defendant's mind
to incriminate himself. 1 7 8 On the other hand, the Supreme Court in
Schmerber ruled that only compelled communications or testimony are
prohibited by the privilege against self-incrimination, and that physical
evidence, such as fingerprints, from a suspect is not subject to Fifth
Amendment protection.17
Therefore, biometric encryption would both enhance user security and
enable law enforcement to obtain evidence in criminal investigations
when law enforcement has detained a suspect. However, this solution
would not address end-to-end encryption, which also presents a difficult
challenge, especially in counterterrorism efforts where end-to-end
encryption is being used by ISIS in recruiting and has likely been used to
plan attacks. End-to-end encryption may not become ubiquitous, though,
because it conflicts with many companies' business models.
3. Split Key Encryption
Professor Geoffrey Corn's proposal of split key encryption is a more
promising potential solution. Encryption keys can be split into separate
parts and stored discretely.18 0 Split keys can be further secured by being
encapsulated inside other encrypted data.18 1 The split keys placed inside
other encrypted data can be placed in the possession of multiple entities,
who would need to cooperate with each other to unlock the set of keys to
ultimately decrypt the sought after information. 1 8 2 Thus, all parties

176. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1988).
177. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 133941 (11th Cir. 2012).
178. Id. at 1346-49. There is an exception to this rule when the government can demonstrate
that the existence of the information sought is a "foregone conclusion." In Fisher, the Supreme
Court held that a testimony was a "foregone conclusion" and therefore did not implicate the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination because the government could show with
"reasonable particularity" that it already knew the location, existence, and authenticity of the

materials that it sought to compel. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11.
179. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (acknowledging that compulsion of
physical evidence does not violate the Fifth Amendment).
180. Geoffrey S. Corn, Averting the Inherent Dangersof 'GoingDark': Why CongressMust
Require a Locked FrontDoor to Encrypted Data, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1433, 1447 (2015).

181.
182.

Id at 1447-48.
Id. at 1448.
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involved would need to be satisfied by the legal order to facilitate
surveillance, and the fact that the key would be split with the discrete
parts stored with separate entities would make it very difficult for illicit
actors to obtain the keys through cyber-theft. This technique would
increase complexity, though, which could create other vulnerabilities that
could be exploited.1 83 This system would require further development to
reduce complexity and to determine how keys would be obtained when
communication occurs across different countries.1 84
4. Cryptographic Envelopes
Also, Matt Tait's, the CEO and founder of Capital Alpha Security and
former Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) information
security specialist, suggestion of cryptographic envelopes presents a very
appealing technological solution. In this approach, the key to the device's
drive would be placed inside a cryptographic envelope.'88 The drive
would then be able to be decrypted either by the user's password or by
opening the cryptographic envelope. 186 The cryptographic envelope
would be addressed to an entity using the entity's public key, which is
published and is what encrypts the information, and would be sealed
using strong cryptography.' 8 7 The cryptographic envelope could only be
opened using that entity's corresponding private key, which is known
only to that entity.'1 8 For additional protection, the cryptographic
envelope could be placed inside other cryptographic envelopes.1 89 Thus,
a cryptographic envelope could be addressed to the FBI using the FBI's
public key, and then placed inside another cryptographic envelope that
could be addressed to the manufacturer using the manufacturer's public
key.1 90 In this scenario, neither the FBI nor the manufacturer could
unilaterally decrypt the information because the FBI could not open the
outer cryptographic envelope because it does not have the manufacturer's
183.
Err on

David Inserra et al., Encryptionand Law Enforcement Special Access: The U.S. Should
the Side of Stronger Encryption, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 4, 2015),

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/09/encryption-and-law-enforcement-special-acce
ss-the-us-should-err-on-the-side-of-stronger-encryption.
184. Id. A legal order to facilitate surveillance issued in one country may not be satisfactory
to an entity in another country. This would raise questions about which country's laws should take
precedent, which country's court system would hear the dispute, and whether international

agreements would be necessary to facilitate such cross-border orders and disputes.
185.

Matt Tait, An Approach to James Comey's Technical Challenge, LAWFARE (Apr. 27,

2016, 7:00 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/ approach-james-comeys-technical-challenge.
186. Id
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private key, and the manufacturer could not open the inner cryptographic
envelope because it does not have the FBI's private key.191 Decryption of
the information would instead require the FBI and manufacturer to work
together following applicable legal process, and other cryptographic
envelopes could even be layered on top for further protection.1 9 2
Therefore, this system would enable law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to obtain information upon legal order, and would "block access
to thieves, foreign governments, hackers, criminal misuse by rogue police
officers without a warrant, or misuse by staff working for the device's
manufacturer."

93

B. Allowing the User to Choose
Ariel Rabkin, a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,
has raised the possibility that users could be empowered to control
whether they use encryption. Manufacturers could be mandated to
produce devices that will provide lawful access, but users could be able
to alter devices to add encryption that would not enable lawful access. 1 9 4
This would remove the increasing tendency for devices to be encrypted
by default. Of course, criminals and terrorists will likely alter devices to
use encryption under this strategy, but many illicit actors will not be
sophisticated enough to do so, and the United States could concentrate
other resources on combating these sophisticated malicious actors.
An alternative approach, put forward by Benjamin Wittes, would be
for encrypted services to be mandated to offer an "Emergency Access
Mode." 19 The "Emergency Access Mode" would enable the company to
unlock the device or decrypt communications upon the death or
incapacity of the consumer, or upon applicable legal process. 1 9 6
Consumers would be prompted to determine whether they wanted to use
the "Emergency Access Mode" or use endpoint or end-to-end encryption
when they first use the device or service.1 97 Under this strategy,
government officials, such as Director Comey, would educate people
about the benefits of choosing the "Emergency Access Mode" by raising
awareness of cases like the unsolved murder that occurred in

191.

Id

192.

Id

193.

Id.

194. Ariel Rabkin, The Crypto Wars: Where Will They End?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar.
4, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/ the-crypto-wars-where-will-they-end/.
195.
Benjamin Wittes, A New Front in the Second Crypto War, LAWFARE (Mar. 15, 2016,
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Louisiana.1 9 8 This approach would also remove the increasing tendency
for devices to encrypt data by default, and many people may choose to
use the "Emergency Access Mode" when they are made aware of the risks
of encryption. " Companies could be required to disclose which
consumers elect to not use the "Emergency Access Mode," and instead
elect to use encryption that cannot be deciphered, even upon a lawful
order. 2 0 0 This information could be cross-referenced with other data, such
as the no-fly list and sex offender registry, which could be useful for law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 2 0 1 However, this requirement
would likely face stiff opposition from privacy advocates, and would
therefore be unlikely to be passed by Congress. Ultimately, these
approaches are dependent on users, who in the end may choose to use
encrypted services, which would render these approaches unhelpful to
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
C. Shifting Industry Incentives
Finally, Benjamin Wittes also put forward the idea that Congress
could condition civil liability immunity "on whether companies maintain
the technical capacity to deliver interpretable signal in response to lawful
wiretap orders." 202 Currently, section 230(c)(1) of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) grants immunity to online service providers and
users from civil suits for third-party conduct, and is very important to
Internet companies. 2 0 3 Congress could condition this immunity on
companies' ability to respond to lawful wiretap orders. 2 04 Companies
would still be able to pursue encryption that cannot be deciphered upon
lawful process, but the potential loss of liability protection may
incentivize companies to maintain the ability to comply with wiretap
orders. This approach would open these companies up to frivolous
lawsuits, though, which could impair business in unintended ways. Also,
companies may be able to rely on other legal defenses, which would
allow them not to alter their behavior in the manner this approach
intends. 205
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Benjamin Wittes, An Out of the Box Approach to the Going DarkProblem, LAWFARE

(Feb. 2, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/out-box-approach-going-dark-problem
[hereinafter Wittes, An Out ofthe Box Approach to the Going Dark Problem].

203. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) Section 230(c)(1) states "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider." Id.
204.

Wittes, An Out ofthe Box Approach to the Going Dark Problem, supra note 202.
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VI. THE PATH FORWARD
Ultimately, there should be a lawful access requirement. Congress
should legislate that companies be required to have the capacity to deliver
decrypted information upon applicable legal process, and not enable users
to alter devices. This legislative requirement should enable the
technology industry to innovate to achieve the mandate, which would
achieve a better outcome than allowing the user to choose or trying to
shift industry incentives through conditional liability protection.
Cryptographic envelopes, split key encryption, and possibly even
biometric encryption, depending on how widespread end-to-end
encryption is adopted, all present potential solutions for achieving this
technological mandate in a secure manner. U.S. companies will likely
compete to provide the most secure products and services for consumers
that comply with this mandate, and will likely develop additional
technological means to comply with the requirement in a secure manner.
These companies are unlikely to lose market power or economic viability
because of a lawful access requirement. This solution would enable law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to continue pursuing their security
missions in an effective manner, and would maintain cybersecurity.
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